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Abstract  
We study returns to academic specialization for Indian corporate sector workers by analyzing cross-
sectional data on male employees randomly selected from six large firms. Our analysis shows that 
going to college pays off, as it brings significant incremental returns over and above school 
education. However, the increase in returns is more pronounced in the specializations of 
management and engineering, and less so in the specializations of science, arts and commerce. Some 
of the less attractive specializations, like commerce and science, tend to make up by rewarding 
progression from Bachelors to Masters. Short-course Diplomas are also rewarding.  
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Academic specialization and returns to education: evidence from India 
1. Introduction 
Traditionally earnings studies relate earnings to total years of schooling - a standard measure of 
human capital - and other observable characteristics. See Schultz (1988) for a survey of the earlier 
literature, Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) for a global update on returns to education and 
Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2003) for emerging issues in the literature. It has now been 
recognized that years of schooling capture only the time dimension of human capital, and fail to 
identify any vertical or horizontal differentiation that may be present between any two individuals 
with the same years of schooling. The vertical difference may reflect a quality hierarchy which can 
be measured by educational test grades or tiers of specialization completed (such as Bachelors or 
Masters), whereas the horizontal differentiation reflects different types of human capital that can be 
identified with different specialization of studies. In many contexts, the type of human capital may 
become more important than the number of years of education. For this reasons, corporations where 
a large number of employees are hired with diverse types of skills and specializations provide a 
natural context where returns to schooling can be studied at a much broader dimension.  
 
The number of papers on returns to academic specialization is relatively few and that too mostly for 
the developed countries; but the evidence wherever available is clear: specialization matters. In the 
context of the US most studies show that natural science and business specializations contribute 
significantly to higher returns than humanities and social sciences for both men and women (see 
Berger (1998), Rumberger and Thomas (1993), and Arcidiacono (2004)). Similarly, for Canada, it 
has been observed by Finnie and Frenette (2003) that for both males and females the returns to 
studying health, engineering, sciences and commerce are higher than that from arts and humanities. 
 3 
Dolton and Vignoles (2000) noted for the UK that engineering and technical education provided 
higher returns for the first job but specialization ceased to matter six years after graduation. Machin 
and Puhani (2003) showed that for both UK and Germany specializations constitute about 24-40% of 
the explained earnings and explain between 8 to 20% of the gender gap in wages. For Northern 
Ireland McGuiness and Bennett (2007) found that for women the returns to specializing in medical 
science and technology are greater than that in social science.  
 
In the context of India, there are few earnings studies available that take into account specialization. 
Duraisamy and Duraisamy (1993) were the first to study returns to scientific and technical 
education. They observed that between men and women the returns were considerably higher for the 
latter. But they could not say whether this specialization was more rewarding over other 
specializations, because their data were confined only to individuals with scientific and technical 
specialization. In a later study using the census data of 1971 and 1981 Duraisamy and Duraisamy 
(1996) compared the mean earnings across specializations. They found that the mean earnings of 
engineering graduates were 1.3 to 1.5 times that of humanities graduates; but due to the aggregative 
nature of the data further analysis was not possible. There is no other study for India, as far as we 
know, that has accounted for detailed specialization. Nevertheless, almost all Indian studies share a 
common result: college education is rewarding, and this finding appears to be robust over the last 
forty years or so, as evidenced by different studies that relied on cross-sectional data at different 
points of time. The above mentioned two studies relate to 1971 and 1981. Saha and Sarkar (1999) 
have reported a similar finding from a 1987 dataset. Then Dutta (2006) has used three datasets from 
1983, 1993-94 and 1999-2000, and Bhandari and Bordoloi (2006) used a 2004-05 dataset, both 
confirming that the marginal rate of returns to education is much higher at the college level.   
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Given the overwhelming evidence of stable and high returns to higher education, it seems imperative 
to get a sense of returns to specialization. But there is a serious problem of data availability. In this 
paper, we use a 1987 dataset drawn from six large Indian firms
1
, which contains detailed information 
on employees’ education, earnings and firm-specific experience. This dataset was originally 
collected and studied by Saha and Sarkar (1999).
2
 Though the data seem to be somewhat dated, it is 
a unique dataset where one can study the returns to specialisation in the context of India. Such 
detailed information for Indian workers on years spent in pursuing different academic specializations 
as our dataset provides is not available from any secondary source or even from large surveys such 
as the National Sample Surveys or census data. Further, as the employees in our dataset belong to 
the same or similar firms, we have a natural control on work environment and certain labour market 
characteristics. For example, all these workers are subject to similar labor and industrial regulations 
that may affect their earnings. All may have some part of their salaries negotiated by their unions, as 
is often the case in large Indian firms. Having a mixture of formal and informal sector employees or 
small and large firm employees can bring in additional issues of labor market segregation which are 
important in developing country contexts. Our dataset allows us to abstract from these problems. At 
the same time, being extremely diversified and large, the six firms we consider employ a wide cross-
section of skilled personnel that is fairly representative of the educated workforce of the country.
3
   
 
                                                          
1
 These firms are publicly traded large business houses and were among the top ten firms in terms of annual turnover 
during the study period.   
2
 The source of the data was company annual reports, which up to 1987 contained detailed data on employees above a 
cut-off income level. A change in regulation led to disappearance of this dataset from the public domain after 1987. 
3
 Ideally one should have longitudinal data for such studies. But for India the national household survey data are not 
longitudinal. Moreover, rarely do we find precise information on education, income and work experience from such 
surveys. One could get such data from the firm sources as public limited companies were required to disclose employee 
details, and 1987 was the last year to obtain this data. After 1987 a change in the regulation allowed firms to report the 
details of their managerial staff only. Building a panel data going back several years prior to 1987 proved difficult.        
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Though the dataset belongs to 1987, our chosen companies are still among the top manufacturing 
companies in India, and they have maintained their dominant position over the last thirty years. 
None has undergone major changes like takeovers, large-scale downsizing or loss of a product range. 
This is in conformity with the continuity of India’s manufacturing sector as a whole, unlike the 
newly emerged information technology or services sectors. Looking from the education side, 
management and technology are still among the most sought after study disciplines in India, as was 
the case thirty years ago. This trend has not changed; if anything, the trend has become stronger. 
Therefore, the potential insight to be gained by analyzing this 1987 data can be helpful even today, 
though admittedly the policy environment has changed.  
 
We estimate returns to specialization (in five categories) and also at different tiers of higher 
education, such as Bachelors and Masters.  Our main finding is that academic specialization matters 
meaning that the marginal rate of returns to college education is strictly positive. But there is also a 
hierarchy among specializations meaning that the specializations matter in different degrees. 
Management education comes on top followed by engineering and commerce
4
 which are at the 
bottom. As for moving from Bachelors to Masters within a specialization, there are no returns except 
in two less attractive specializations – science and commerce. However our work is limited by the 
absence of information on individual ability (e.g. high school grades or IQ test scores). To that 
extent our results for returns to education may be influenced by unobserved ability. In this sense the 
rates of returns to specialisations are overestimated.  Moreover our regression approach only reflects 
the association of a particular academic specialization with higher or lower earnings and does not 
                                                          
4
 Commerce specialization in India largely involves studying accountancy and book-keeping, and does not go into 
business management issues. This in turn helps commerce graduates to start careers in accounting firms, tax consultancy 
and related services, whereas management graduates aim for junior managerial positions in the corporate sector.  
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explicitly test for causality from education to earnings. We provide a detailed discussion of our 
findings later in the results section.  
 
Here we would like to distinguish our work from that of Saha and Sarkar (1999) as we use the same 
dataset. Saha and Sarkar were mainly concerned with the trade-off between returns to education and 
returns to work experience and so they modelled education simply in terms of the schooling years 
ignoring specialization. In contrast, our primary focus is on the differences between distinct 
specializations within college education, which has been largely ignored in the growing earnings 
literature on India. See for instance, Tilak (1987), Duraisamy and Duraisamy (1998), Kingdon and 
Unni (2001), Duraisamy (2002) and the articles cited earlier. Even though study periods and 
coverage varied, all these studies confirm the importance of college education, but do not go far 
enough to identify returns to specialization. We try to fill this gap.
5
  
  
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and Section 3 presents the empirical 
analysis. The results are discussed in Section 4 followed by concluding remarks. 
 
2. Data and the average age-earnings profile 
Our data are collected from the annual reports of six large Indian private sector firms for the 
financial year April 1986 to March 1987. All public limited companies, as per regulations in India, 
were required to publish details about employees whose gross annual earnings exceed a certain level. 
In 1986-87, the cutoff earnings level was Rs. 36000.
6
 We address the sample selection bias due to 
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 Our period of analysis falls in between the study periods of Duraisamy (2002) – i.e. between 1981 and 1991. When 
combined with other studies our work may help us to understand how the Indian industry valued higher education in the 
run up to large scale economic reforms undertaken in 1991, after which the economy moved to a higher growth path. 
6
 In 1986-87, the exchange rate was roughly $1 = Rs. 15.  
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this income cut-off in our estimation methodology. The details of the information include, name of 
the employee, sex, age, date of joining the present firm, educational degrees, total number of years 
worked before joining the firm, and gross and net (after income tax deductions and pension 
contributions) earnings for the current year. 
 
The six firms that we selected were among the largest in India in terms of turnover for that year, and 
they have been maintaining their strong positions for over two decades. They were (and still are) 
highly diversified firms producing a wide range of products such as textiles, cement, automobiles, 
steel and providing construction and engineering works. Their offices and production facilities are 
located all over India. They attract a wide range of workers from across the country. While in the 
cement and textile sector one may find less educated (e.g. school drop-outs) workers (such as 
spinners, pourers and fitters), in the automobile and engineering sector there may be highly educated 
workers coming from the country’s premier engineering colleges.7 From each company a random 
sample of 10% of the employees was chosen and the female workers, being very few in number, 
were excluded from our analysis. This left us with a sample of 3327 workers.
8
 
 
Like any other developing country, India’s labor market is dualistic. The share of industry in total 
employment is only about 20%, and within the industrial sector there is a very large informal sector.
9
 
Our study relates only to the formal industrial sector, within which public sector firms and 
multinationals also play significant roles. The hiring practice of public sector firms is not too 
different from the large private sector firms (except for some affirmative action policy). However, 
                                                          
7
 Our results mostly capture features of the Indian corporate sector and may not relate to hiring practices of other sectors 
such as small and medium enterprises. 
8
 The raw data was available only in hard copy. Compiling a large dataset with all the employees proved too costly. 
Hence a 10% sample was decided upon.  
9
 The definition of informal sector is loose. Generally firms that are small and are outside a number of work-related 
regulations fall in this category. 
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during our study period the presence of multinationals in India was minimal. Therefore, caution 
should be used in extrapolating our results to foreign firms and small firms. Subject to these 
qualifications, we believe our data will be representative of the formal industrial sector as a whole.     
 
A bird’s eye view of the data is presented in Table 1. As is evident from the average age of the 
workers, the sample consists largely of middle aged workers. This is due to the fact that we could 
observe only those workers whose earnings exceeded a certain level. However, in terms of years of 
schooling, the workforce appears to be fairly educated. The average years of schooling for the 
sample of 3327 workers are 11.63 years. However, as the wide gap between the minimum (1 year) 
and the maximum (22 years) suggest, we do have a wide cross section of individuals. This is also 
true for age and earnings. The average (gross annual) earnings are Rs. 51374. This figure is near the 
minimum (Rs. 36000) and far below the maximum (Rs. 267000). Indeed in our sample, entries with 
earnings in excess of Rs. 150000 are fewer. Apart from the variations in the data, our large sample 
size of over three thousand observations is also likely to contribute to the robustness of the estimates. 
 
(Table 1 about here) 
 
Given the primary information of main degrees and additional diplomas or degrees of the individuals 
in our data sources, we have converted them into schooling years. Secondary schooling means 10 
years, higher secondary 12 years,
10
 Bachelors (non-engineering) 15 years, Masters 17 years, 
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 However, prior to 1980 in many states of India higher secondary meant 11 years of schooling, and engineering 
undergraduate studies were 5 years long. Such discrepancies were gradually eliminated between 1977 and 1987. 
Therefore, we had to choose a cutoff year and make adjustments in the years of schooling. This led us to assign 11 years 
of schooling to higher secondary, if the individual was older than 27 years at the time of our study. For higher education 
we have used the programme durations that are standard across colleges in India. However, there might be some odd 
exceptions which remained unaccounted for. Thus, for older workers Bachelors would mean 14 years of educations and 
Masters 16 years of education. 
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engineering Bachelors 16 years and engineering Masters 18 years.
11
 Lastly, for most diplomas, we 
have not assigned any years on the ground that diplomas can be acquired as a trainee or part-time 
student.
12
 
 
Having defined the schooling years, we obtain its distribution and mean age and earnings for each of 
the schooling levels in Table 2a (without counting the diplomas). Note that the distribution of 
schooling years is bi-modal and well spread out. There are two concentration points, one between 10 
and 12 years and the other at 16 years of schooling. More than 50 percent of the workers in our 
sample have secondary or higher secondary education. At 13 years of schooling which refers to 
incomplete college education, the distribution sharply falls, but then it reaches another height at 14 
(Bachelors or incomplete Bachelors; see footnote 10) and 16 (Masters and engineering Bachelors 
combined, see footnote 10). The last two categories account for 24 percent of the workforce. A 
further disaggregate picture is presented with respect to specializations in Table 2b. As can be seen 
58.10% of the sample consists of workers having higher education or having completed school and 
acquired a diploma. Among them 28.55% are diploma holders (majority of which are in 
engineering), and the remaining employees are evenly spread out among Arts, Science and 
Engineering, while Management claims a small share – only 1.23%. The small share of Management 
is explainable by the pyramid structure of employees, with few managers on top. 
(Tables 2a and 2b about here) 
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 We have a handful of cases of PhD or similar post-Masters education; however they have been clubbed with the 
category Masters.  
12
 We assumed that individuals did not take any break from their education. It is quite uncommon in India for students to 
take time off from their school or college education. Because of a persistent problem of oversubscription in most 
colleges, fresh applicants are always admitted in preference to applicants with interrupted schooling. However, after 
admission some students might have to repeat a year. As long as this proportion is small our results remain unaffected.   
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3. The model 
 Our starting point is a basic Mincer earnings function: 
  ln yi = c + si + 1xi +2xi
2
 +1zi+ zi
2
 + ui      (1) 
where yi is annual earnings of individual i, si is  his years of schooling, xi the work experience (in 
years) in the current firm which we call tenure
13
, zi the past work experience (prior to joining the 
current employer) and ui is a random error term which is assumed to be normally distributed with 
zero mean and  variance. We then introduce dummy variables to distinguish academic 
specializations in higher education – such as arts, science, commerce etc.  This gives us: 
iiiii
j
jij
j
jijii uzzxxDSscy  

2
21
2
21
3
1
5
1
ln      (2) 
 
Here, Sj is a dummy variable for the j-th specialization in university (which refers to degrees in five 
fields of study
14
, namely, arts, commerce, science, engineering and management). The excluded 
category covers those employees who did not have college or university education. In India while 
the universities award degrees, there are polytechnics or specialized training colleges that award 
diplomas based on short courses in various fields suitable for part-time students. We include such 
diplomas as well. Dj refers to j-th diploma dummy and there are three diplomas – engineering, 
management and social studies. The excluded category is for no diploma and a range of different 
diplomas which are neither management, nor engineering. Note the difference between diplomas and 
specialization dummies. Though both can be in the same field diploma dummies refer to 
qualifications acquired at polytechnics, while the specialization dummies pertain to degrees obtained 
from a university.  
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 Tenure may capture effects of on-the-job learning, training and firm-worker matching. In the absence of additional 
information we cannot separate out these possible effects.  
14
 Arts refers to humanities, and not fine arts. 
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We include both diplomas and degrees (i.e. specializations) as the number of individuals having one 
or the other is significantly high. To be specific, 983 workers (or 30% of observations) hold degrees 
but do not have diplomas (please see table 2b for the distribution). On the other hand 950 workers 
(or 29% of observations) have diplomas but not university degrees. For instance in case of 
engineering, 277 workers have an undergraduate (BTech) degree in engineering (out of whom 37 
went on to acquire postgraduate degree i.e. MTech) but these workers do not have an engineering 
diploma. There were 708 engineering diploma holders who do not have a degree in engineering. 
Therefore, by including both subject specialism and diploma dummies in the same regression we 
will be able to compare the effects that these different qualifications have on earnings. 
 
Finally the schooling variable is modified and introduced as spline variables (linear splines denoting 
the number of years spent in studying the relevant specialization at a particular level), which allows 
us to capture the branching out of individuals in different specializations (in their higher studies) and 
at the same time directly measure incremental rate of returns to such specialized education. 
Diplomas are also taken into account, but they appear as dummy variables.   
 
Thus the final model becomes: 
 
iiiii
j
jij
j
j
i
j
j
j
i
j
iii uzzxxDsssscy  

2
21
2
21
3
1
5
1
44
5
1
332211ln    (3) 
 
Here, the spline variables are defined as follows: s1 refers to schooling up to the secondary level, s2 
higher secondary, s3
j
 Bachelors study with j-th specialization, s4
j
 refers to Masters with j-th 
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specialization and Dj refers to j-th diploma dummy. The specializations and diploma categories are 
as described earlier.  
 
We provide a caveat that specialisation may be highly correlated with ‘ability’, because high ability 
workers may be sorted out early on by channelling them into different academic specialization, and 
in the absence of any control for ability (such as high school grades or IQ test scores), returns to 
specialization may also capture in part returns to ability as well. While in India high ‘ability’ 
students are generally encouraged to appear for highly competitive entrance exams for management 
and engineering education, it is equally conceivable that a student may ‘prefer’ to specialize in 
science or social science than ‘engineering’ even if she is perfectly capable of doing well in the 
latter. In the absence of any data on individuals’ innate ability, we accept that our estimates may 
include returns to ability and thus upwardly bias the returns to specialization. That said, it is 
reasonable to assume that the bias, if it exists, would be systematic leaving the relative ranking of 
specializations in terms of returns unaffected.  
   
An important point in the context of estimating our model is that we cannot use the Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) regression method for the fact that in our sample we do not observe workers whose 
annual gross earnings were below Rs.36000.  As the distribution of earnings is truncated, the OLS 
estimates will be biased and inconsistent. We therefore use maximum likelihood (ML) estimation 
with truncated distribution to address the sample selection bias.  
 
Consider the case where we observe the true dependent variable ln yi
*
 as ln yi only when it exceeds a 
threshold level, say y. This can be represented as: 
 13 
ln yi
*
 = Xiβ + ui, 
ln yi = ln yi
*
 if yi
*
 > y 
where Xi is a vector of explanatory variables, β is the vector of unknown parameters to be estimated 
and ui is a normally distributed error term with mean 0 and variance 
2
.
15
 
 
Under this specification, the likelihood function based on which the ML estimates are obtained is 
given by: 

1
iL
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To test for significance of the coefficient estimates, robust standard errors are employed using the 
Huber-White sandwich estimator. 
 
 
4. The Results 
The estimates of equation (1) are shown in Table 3 in two panels, one without firm controls and the 
other with firm controls.
16
 All the explanatory variables have the expected signs. In the first panel 
(without firm controls) the rate of returns to schooling is 8 percent, while the same to tenure 
(experience in the current firm) and past experience (experience in previous firms) are 5.5 percent 
and 4.7 percent respectively. Both of these experience components exert concavity as is commonly 
seen in such studies. It is noteworthy that education yields higher returns than tenure, and tenure 
higher than past experience. This is consistent with other Indian studies such as Duraisamy and 
                                                          
15
 Admittedly our results are subject to validity of the strong distributional assumptions and the log linear functional 
form. However we feel it is reasonable to assume a normal distribution in case of our large sample and the log linear 
form as is a common practice in similar econometric studies. 
16
 All estimations were done in Stata (release 11). 
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Duraisamy (1996) and Duraisamy (2002).  We can compare our estimates with that of Duraisamy 
and Duraisamy (1996) for their 1981 data where for the male workers the rates of returns to 
education and experience were 5.9 percent and 5.3 percent (their Table 5, p.52), and with that of 
Duraisamy (2002) for his analysis of 1993-94 data which is reported by education level in his Table 
3 (p.616). Rate of returns to work experience in these two studies (though they correspond to 
different time periods) is in the order of 5.3 to 6 percent, fairly close to ours. 
 
In the second panel we report the estimates with firm controls. As can be seen, rate of returns to 
schooling and tenure both improve marginally, but returns to past experience fall. Compared to the 
benchmark firm (firm 6), all firms except one (firm 1) have significant effects on earning.  
 
(Table 3 about here) 
 
Now we add dummy variables for academic specialization into equation (1) and these estimates are 
shown in Table 4, again in two panels - without firm controls and with firm controls. There are five 
dummy variables for five fields of specializations for graduate studies – arts (i.e. humanities), 
science, commerce, engineering and management. We also include short-course diplomas (which are 
one-year or two-year long) – engineering, management and social study. The dummies are all 
significant, except for arts and commerce (see the first panel). However, the returns to schooling 
marginally fall (as compared to Table 1), as the specialization dummies separate the effects of years 
of education from the field of education. It is noteworthy that management degree dummy has a 
higher coefficient than any other degree dummies, followed by engineering and science, highlighting 
the attractiveness of management as a field of education. For diplomas also management is most 
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rewarding. This picture remains intact even after we control for firm-specific effects (second panel). 
Somewhat curiously the coefficient of management dummy falls and the gap between management 
and engineering is narrowed down a bit. Similar is the case with engineering and management 
diplomas, though in this case coefficients rise for both of them. 
 
Finally, we estimate equation (3) where education is modeled as a sequence of spline variables 
reflecting individuals’ branching out in different specializations (conditional on reaching college) 
and progressing to higher tier of specialization. As said earlier, tier of study captures vertical 
differentiation of human capital, while specialization captures horizontal differentiation. 
 
Table 5 reports the results of this regression. Consider the estimates reported in the first panel. First 
of all, the rate of returns to secondary schooling is 6.4%, which then rises to 8.2% with the 
completion of the higher secondary education. Second, this rate of return is even bettered with 
college education, as the incremental return from Bachelors study in any specialization is positive 
and significant. That is to say, higher education is rewarding. Further, rate of returns to Bachelors 
study is different across specialization giving rise to a hierarchy that is consistent with common 
perception and it also refines the stylized fact on higher education in India emerging from the 
earnings literature discussed earlier. Social studies in general fare poorly compared to scientific and 
technical studies. Bachelors study in management yields an incremental return of 15.4 percent per 
annum as compared to 12.4 percent for engineering, 6.3 percent for science, 5.1 percent for arts and 
2.6 percent for commerce. Compared to the 8.2% rate of return to the higher secondary level, the 
returns are much higher for management and engineering, but lower for other specializations, and in 
particular it is noticeably so for commerce.  
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Third, for commerce and science, the loss in the marginal rate of return is more than compensated by 
progressing to Masters. Progressing to Masters is most rewarding for science, generating an 
incremental return of 9.8%, while for commerce -- the only other category where it is statistically 
significant -- it is 7.5%. In the case of arts and management, the additional returns are statistically 
insignificant but positive – 1.9% for arts and 12.1% for management. This means that even though 
the estimates are not reliable in a statistical sense, Masters study in these two specializations also 
brings some additional returns which are however smaller in comparison with Bachelors study. 
Finally in the case of engineering Masters study might actually reduce earnings. This might reflect a 
negative perception of postgraduates in engineering. Progression to Masters might indicate that the 
person was unable to find a placement immediately after her Bachelors degree which is the standard 
acceptable qualification in engineering in India. However, even here the Masters coefficient is 
statistically insignificant. Thus, we see that vertical differentiation is not always rewarding. Masters 
might be regarded as academic training more geared towards research, and industries that do not 
focus on R&D (as is typically the case in developing countries) may not be willing to pay a premium 
for such degrees.   
 
Fourth, the above point is indirectly corroborated by the significance of short-course diplomas, 
which are exclusively geared towards industry needs. The estimates reveal that engineering and 
management diplomas significantly add to earnings, relative to individuals having no diplomas. Here 
too management tops the list followed by engineering. We should note that the value of the intercept 
parameter is 9.169. A management diploma alone adds 0.08 to it and an engineering diploma adds 
0.063 to it. A social study diploma adds only 0.05 but it is not statistically significant. 
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On the second panel we include firm dummies. As before Firm 1 is not significant and the 
specialization hierarchy remains unchanged. However, except for Bachelors in science and 
commerce, coefficients for all other Bachelors specializations slightly fall; for Bachelors in science 
and commerce the coefficients actually rise. For diplomas on the other hand, the coefficients 
increase for both management and engineering. As in Table 4, here too the gap between 
management and engineering gets narrower when firm controls are taken into account.   
 
(Table 5 about here) 
 
5. Conclusion 
The literature on returns to education has paid scant attention to the issue of academic specialization 
and quality hierarchy therein. This is more so for developing countries. This paper has tried to fill 
this gap by using a dataset from India. We find that college education is rewarding, but its returns 
vary depending on the specialization. Management and technical fields generate higher returns than 
general streams (science, commerce and arts). But we do not always find progression from 
Bachelors to Masters rewarding; it is rewarding only for those specializations, which are at the lower 
order of the specialization hierarchy. This suggests that vertical skill differentiation may not be as 
important as horizontal skill differentiation. These observations are robust, as we control for firm 
specific effects, current firm experience and past experience.  
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The above findings may help us understand why Indian industries have been able to grow in high 
technology sectors in recent times. The growth in technology sectors may reflect demand-side 
factors, policy changes and global opportunities. However the history of rewarding higher education 
also played some role in ensuring adequate supply of technical skills which were necessary to 
support the growth. While this might have caused significant earnings inequality among the labor 
force between skilled and unskilled, educated and less educated, and between the formal and 
informal sectors, the policy makers should see such inequalities in proper perspective. High returns 
to technical specializations may reflect the Indian industry’s strategy to improve its productivity.  
 
There are some limitations of our study that we need to be cautious about while generalizing our 
findings to Indian industry today. First, in recent time multinational firms and specialized Indian 
outsourcing firms have emerged as equally significant employers of educated workers along with the 
traditional manufacturing firms. While this trend is likely to enhance returns to technical and 
management education both, their relative importance might change due to the influence of overseas 
markets. Second, our study did not include women; therefore, we could not say anything about 
gender inequality. It remains to be seen, if academic specialization can explain gender gap, or if 
there is reverse gender gap within some specializations. Third, our estimates for returns to education 
are subject to the functional form we have employed for the Mincer equation and the distributional 
assumptions of the maximum likelihood estimation. Fourth, our results may not necessarily extend 
to the broader Indian economy specifically to the informal sector and small firms. They are only 
indicative and need to be treated with caution in relation to other sectors. Fifth, owing to a lack of 
control for individual ability, our returns to specialization estimates may have an upward bias. As 
might be expected, higher ability students go to university and possibly even choose more attractive 
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specializations. Hence, some of the higher returns may reflect ability and motivation, which we have 
omitted due to lack of information. Sixth, the standard regression approach we have employed can 
only examine the association between specialization and earnings and cannot provide any causal 
interpretation. Finally, there are some measurement issues (such as the exact years associated with 
each spline variable) that could not be effectively dealt with due to lack of information. 
Nevertheless, our study provides a benchmark with which new studies can be contrasted to see to 
what extent economic reforms and globalization have benefitted the educated Indian workers.            
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum 
    
Earnings (Rs.) 51374 36000 267000 
Schooling (yrs.) 11.63 1.00 22.00 
Age (yrs.) 41.94 22.00 69.00 
Total experience (yrs.) 19.20 1.00 47.00 
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Table 2a: Schooling years, mean age and earnings  
 
Schooling 
(years) 
 % in total 
sample 
Mean age 
(years) 
Mean earnings 
(Rs.) 
    
8 1.35 43.00 42821 
9 9.67 46.54 45516 
10 29.11 43.00 48275 
11 10.69 41.73 48890 
12 12.80 39.30 49593 
13 1.47 42.00 49854 
14 11.11 42.65 53387 
16
a
   7.75 38.30 65615 
16
b
 5.47 37.20 60220 
17 5.47 39.49 65215 
18 1.50 37.90 61681 
Note: 
a
 refers to engineering undergraduate, 
b
 refers to Masters in general studies. 
 
 
Table 2b: Distribution of specializations  
  
 Numbers % of total  Numbers % of total 
School and no higher education 1394 41.90    
Higher education 1933 58.10    
      
    of which BA 168 5.05 BA and MA 79 2.37 
    of which BCom 219 6.58 BCom and MCom 83 2.49 
    of which BSc 278 8.36 BSc and MSc 107 3.22 
    of which BTech 277 8.33 BTech and MTech 37 1.11 
    of which BBA 41 1.23 BBA and MBA 41 1.23 
    of which Diploma 950 28.55    
        Engineering Diploma 708 21.28    
        Management Diploma 158 4.75    
        Social study Diploma 84 2.52    
Note: The figures for higher education reflect degree/ diploma completions.
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Table 3: Basic Mincer regressions  
 
 
 Model without firm dummies Model with firm dummies 
 Coefficient Standard  
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Coefficient Standard  
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Schooling 0.080** 0.004 0.0724, 0.0878 0.082** 0.003 0.0755, 0.0886 
Tenure 0.055** 0.004 0.0477, 0.0628 0.059** 0.004 0.0517, 0.0654 
Tenure-square -0.001** <0.001 0.0011, -0.0007 -0.001** <0.001 -0.0011, -0.0008 
Past Exp 0.047** 0.003 0.0409, 0.0537 0.029** 0.003 0.0235, 0.0342 
Past Exp-square -0.001** <0.001 -0.0009, -0.0004  <0.001 <0.001 -0.0003, 0.0002 
Firm 1    0.032 0.031 -0.0280, 0.0926 
Firm 2    0.364** 0.024 0.3166, 0.4104 
Firm 3    0.398** 0.025 0.3486, 0.4474 
Firm 4    0.192** 0.036 0.1208, 0.2623 
Firm 5    0.098** 0.025 0.0492, 0.1477 
Constant 9.020** 0.084 8.8558,  9.1832 8.794** 0.077 8.6440, 8.9440 
       
Number of obs. 3327   3327   
Pseudo LL 1209.121   1489.479   
Wald Chi-Square 578.960   876.200   
 
Note: The dependent variable is annual earnings in rupees. Schooling is total education years, Tenure is in-job work 
experience in years and Past Exp is previous work experience in years (before joining the current employer); Firm 1-5 
are dummy variables (Firm 6 is the base category); * and ** indicate statistically significant coefficients at 5% and 1% 
levels respectively. 
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Table 4: Returns to education with specialization effects 
 
  
 Model without firm dummies Model with firm dummies 
Coefficient Standard  
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Coefficient Standard  
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Schooling 0.059** 0.006 0.0464, 0.0713 0.058** 0.005 0.0478, 0.0679 
Arts   -0.044   0.044 -0.1299, 0.0410    -0.041 0.038 -0.1150, 0.0325 
Commerce   -0.048 0.040 -0.1267, 0.0301    -0.009 0.033 -0.0732, 0.0560 
Science 0.079* 0.036 0.0091, 0.1489 0.151** 0.031 0.0911, 0.2109 
Engineering 0.288** 0.040 0.2096, 0.3658 0.285** 0.033 0.2204, 0.3492 
Management 0.395** 0.067 0.2629, 0.5268 0.371** 0.057 0.2588, 0.4827 
Engineering Dip 0.039* 0.020 0.0002, 0.0769 0.068** 0.016 0.0357, 0.1002 
Management Dip 0.098** 0.026 0.0461, 0.1495 0.111** 0.025 0.0615, 0.1605 
Social study Dip 0.040** 0.040 -0.0396, 0.1190 0.008 0.035 -0.0604, 0.0767 
Tenure 0.056** 0.004 0.0495, 0.0632 0.059** 0.003 0.0531, 0.0657 
Tenure-square -0.001** <0.001 -0.0011, -0.0008 -0.001** <0.001 -0.0011, -0.0008 
Past Exp 0.047** 0.003 0.0415, 0.0531 0.030** 0.002 0.0256, 0.0350 
Past Exp-square -0.001** <0.001 -0.0009, -0.0004 <0.001 <0.001 -0.0004, <0.001 
Firm 1    0.026 0.028 -0.0286, 0.0808 
Firm 2    0.338** 0.021 0.2965, 0.3800 
Firm 3    0.386** 0.023 0.3413, 0.4309 
Firm 4    0.184** 0.031 0.1236, 0.2448 
Firm 5      0.072* 0.023 0.0274, 0.1159 
Constant 9.226** 0.087 9.0561, 9.3964 9.032** 0.076 8.8829, 9.1820 
       
Number of obs. 3327   3327   
Pseudo LL 1313.240   1630.900   
Wald Chi-square 793.440   1240.600   
 
Note: All education variables (except Schooling) are dummy variables (those who did not go to college form the base 
category); Dip refers to Diploma (no diploma and other diplomas forms the base category); * and ** indicate statistically 
significant coefficients at 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 5: Returns to specialization years 
 
 
 Model without firm dummies Model with firm dummies 
Coefficient Standard  
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Coefficient Standard  
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Secondary 0.064** 0.011 0.0427, 0.0859 0.062** 0.008 0.0466, 0.0778 
Higher 
Secondary 0.082** 0.019 0.0447, 0.1187 0.082** 0.015 0.0515, 0.1115 
BA 0.051** 0.014 0.0246, 0.0784 0.048** 0.012 0.0232, 0.0719 
MA 0.019 0.021 -0.0225, 0.0601 0.028 0.019 -0.0099, 0.0660 
BCom  0.026* 0.011 0.0046, 0.0481 0.036** 0.010 0.0174, 0.0552 
MCom 0.075** 0.015 0.0455, 0.1055 0.082** 0.014 0.0535, 0.1098 
BSc 0.063** 0.010 0.0425, 0.0831 0.092** 0.009 0.0748, 0.1098 
MSc 0.098** 0.020 0.0589, 0.1371 0.077** 0.016 0.0466, 0.1078 
BTech 0.124** 0.007 0.1102, 0.1368 0.121** 0.006 0.1102, 0.1328 
MTech   -0.033 0.028 -0.0867, 0.0217    -0.026 0.020 -0.0653, 0.0125 
BBA  0.154* 0.076 0.0046, 0.3031  0.130* 0.067 -0.0021, 0.2613 
MBA     0.121 0.194 -0.2584, 0.5013 0.155 0.171 -0.1808, 0.4912 
Engineering Dip 0.063** 0.019 0.0260, 0.1007 0.093** 0.016 0.0608, 0.1252 
Management Dip 0.080** 0.028 0.0252, 0.1341 0.094** 0.027 0.0418, 0.1458 
Social study Dip 0.050 0.042 -0.0318, 0.1310 0.009 0.036 -0.0620, 0.0809 
Tenure 0.057** 0.003 0.0505, 0.0642 0.060** 0.003 0.0543, 0.0667 
Tenure-square -0.001** <0.001 -0.0011, -0.0008 -0.001** <0.001 -0.0011, -0.0008 
Past Exp 0.047** 0.003 0.0417, 0.0531 0.031** 0.002 0.0260, 0.0354 
Past Exp-square -0.001** <0.001 -0.0009, -0.0004 <0.001 <0.001 -0.0004, <0.001 
Firm 1    0.019 0.028 -0.0356, 0.0733 
Firm 2    0.334** 0.021 0.2922, 0.3760 
Firm 3    0.381** 0.023 0.3363, 0.4251 
Firm 4    0.184** 0.030 0.1243, 0.2434 
Firm 5     0.069* 0.023 0.0244, 0.1131 
Constant 9.169** 0.120 8.9340, 9.4039 8.987** 0.094 8.8036, 9.1710 
       
Number of obs. 3327   3327   
Pseudo LL 1320.015   1635.922   
Wald Chi-square 893.750   1411.130   
 
Note: All education variables (except Diplomas) are splines (number of years spent in the corresponding programme);  
BA, BCom, BSc, BTech, BBA = Bachelors in arts, commerce, science, engineering, management respectively; MA, 
MCom, MSc, MTech, MBA= Masters in the above specializations respectively; Diplomas are dummy variables; * and 
** indicate statistically significant coefficients at 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
